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BRIEF DESCRIPTION
Disinformation can appear in various forms. 
Firstly, different formats can be manipulated, 
such as texts, images, and videos. Secondly, the 
amount and degree of falseness can vary, from 
completely fabricated content to decontextuali-
zed information to satire that intentionally mis-
leads recipients. Therefore, the forms and for-
mat of disinformation might vary and differ not 
only between the supposedly clear categories of 
“true” and “false”.
FIELD OF APPLICATION/THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
Studies on types of disinformation are conducted 
in various fields, e.g. political communication, 
journalism studies, and media effects studies. 
Among other things, the studies identify the 
most common types of mis- or disinformation 
during certain events (Brennen, Simon, Howard, 
& Nielsen, 2020), analyze and categorize the be-
havior of different types of Twitter accounts (Lin-
vill & Warren, 2020), and investigate the existen-
ce of serveral types of “junk news” in different 
national media landscapes (Bradshaw, Howard, 
Kollanyi, & Neudert, 2020; Neudert, Howard, & 
Kollanyi, 2019).
REFERENCES/COMBINATION WITH OTHER  
METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION
Only relatively few studies use combinations of 
methods. Some studies identify different types 
of disinformation via qualitative and quantitati-
ve content analyses (Bradshaw et al., 2020; Bren-
nen et al., 2020; Linvill & Warren, 2020; Neudert 
et al., 2019). Others use surveys to analyze re-
spondents’ concerns as well as exposure towards 
different types of mis- and disinformation (Flet-
cher, 2018).
EXAMPLE STUDIES
Brennen et al. (2020); Bradshaw et al. (2020); Lin-
vill and Warren (2020)
INFORMATION ON EXAMPLE STUDIES
Types of disinformation are defined by the pre-
sentation and contextualization of content and 
sometimes additionally by details (e.g. professio-
nalism) about the communicator. Studies either 
deductively identify different types of disinfor-
mation (Brennen et al., 2020) by applying the 
theoretical framework by Wardle (2019), or ad-
ditionally inductively identify and build different 
categories based on content analyses (Bradshaw 
et al., 2020; Linvill & Warren, 2020).
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Table 1. Types of mis-/disinformation by Brennen et al. (2020).
Category Specification
Satire or parody -
False connection Headlines, visuals or captions don’t support the content
Misleading content Misleading use of information to frame an issue or individu-
al, when facts/information are misrepresented or skewed
False context Genuine content is shared with false contextual information, 
e.g. real imag-es which have been taken out of context
Imposter content Genuine sources, e.g. news outlets or government agencies, 
are imper-sonated
Fabricated content Content is made up and 100% false; designed to deceive and 
do harm
Manipulated content Genuine information or imagery is manipulated to deceive, 
e.g. deepfakes or other kinds of manipulation of audio and/or 
visuals
Note. The categories are adapted from the theoretical framework by Wardle (2019). The coding 
instruction was: “To the best of your ability, what type of misinformation is it? (Select one 
that fits best.)” (Brennen et al., 2020, p. 12). The coders reached an intercoder reliability of a 
Cohen’s kappa of 0.82.
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Table 2. Criteria for the “junk news” label by Bradshaw et al. (2020).
Criteria Reference Specification
Professionalism refers to the informa-
tion about authors and 
the organization
“Sources do not employ the standards and best 
practices of professional journalism, including 
information about real authors, editors, and 
owners” (pp. 174-175). “Distinct from other forms 
of user-generated content and citizen journalism, 
junk news domains satisfy the professionalism 
criterion because they purposefully refrain from 
providing clear information about real authors, 
editors, publishers, and owners, and they do not 
publish corrections of debunked information” (p. 
176).
Procedure: 
• Systematically checked the about pages of 
domains: Contact information, information 
about ownership and editors, and other infor-
mation relating to professional standards
• Reviewed whether the sources appeared in 
third-party fact-checking reports
• Checked whether sources published correcti-
ons of fact-checked reporting. 
Examples: zerohedge.com, conservative- fighters.
org, deepstatenation.news 
Counterfeit refers to the layout and 
design of the domain 
itself
“(…) [S]ources mimic established news repor-
ting by using certain fonts, having branding, and 
employing content strategies. (…) Junk news is 
stylistically disguised as professional news by 
the inclusion of references to news agencies and 
credible sources as well as headlines written in a 
news tone with date, time, and location stamps. 
In the most extreme cases, outlets will copy logos 
and counterfeit entire domains” (p. 176).
Procedure: 
• Systematically reviewed organizational infor-
mation about the owner and headquarters by 
checking sources like Wikipedia, the WHOIS 
database, and third-party fact-checkers (like 
Politico or MediaBiasFactCheck)
• Consulted country-specific expert knowledge 
of the media landscape in the US to identify 
counterfeiting websites.




Style refers to the content of 
the domain as a whole
“ (…) [S]tyle is concerned with the literary devices 
and language used throughout news reporting. 
(…) Designed to systematically manipulate users 
for political purposes, junk news sources deploy 
propaganda techniques to persuade users at an 
emotional, rather than cognitive, level and employ 
techniques that include using emotionally driven 
language with emotive expressions and symbo-
lism, ad hominem attacks, misleading headlines, 
exaggeration, excessive capitalization, unsafe 
generalizations, logical fallacies, moving images 
and lots of pictures or mobilizing memes, and in-
nuendo (Bernays, 1928; Jowette & O’Donnell, 2012; 
Taylor, 2003). (…) Stylistically, problematic sources 
will employ propaganda and clickbait techniques 
to varying degrees. As a result, determining style 
can be highly complex and context dependent” (p. 
177). 
Procedure: 
• Examined at least five stories on the front page 
of each news source in depth during the US 
presidential campaign in 2016 and the SOTU 
address in 2018
• Checked the headlines of the stories and the 
content of the articles for literary and visual 
propaganda devices
• Considered as stylistically problematic if three 
of the five stories systematically exhibited 




Credibility refers to the content of 
the domain as a whole
“(…) [S]ources rely on false information or conspi-
racy theories and do not post corrections” (p. 175). 
“[They] typically report on unsubstantiated claims 
and rely on conspiratorial and dubious sources. 
(…) Junk news sources that satisfy the credibility 
criterion frequently fail to vet their sources, do 
not consult multiple sources, and do not fact-
check” (p. 178). 
Procedure: 
• Examined at least five front page stories and 
reviewed the sources that were cited
• Reviewed pages to see if they included known 
conspiracy theories on issues such as climate 





• Checked third-party fact-checkers for eviden-
ce of debunked stories and conspiracy theo-
ries
Examples: infowars.com, endingthefed.com, the-
gatewaypundit.com, newspunch.com 
Bias refers to the content of 
the domain as a whole
“(…) [H]yper-partisan media websites and blogs 
(…) are highly biased, ideologically skewed, and 
publish opinion pieces as news. Basing their 
stories on the same events, these sources manage 
to convey strikingly different impressions of what 
actually transpired. It is such systematic differen-
ces in the mapping from facts to news reports that 
we call bias. (…) Bias exists on both sides of the 
political spectrum. Like determining style, de-
termining bias can be highly complex and context 
dependent” (pp. 177-178). 
Procedure: 
• Checked third-party sources that systematical-
ly evaluate media bias
• If the domain was not evaluated by a third 
party, the authors examined the ideological 
leaning of the sources used to support stories 
appearing on the domain
• Evaluation of the labeling of politicians (are 
there differences between the left and the 
right?)
• Identified bias created through the omission 
of unfavorable facts, or through writing that is 
falsely presented as being objective
Examples on the right: breitbart.com, dailycaller.
com, infowars.com, truthfeed.com 
Examples on the left: occupydemocrats.com, ad-
dictinginfo.com, bipartisanreport.com 
Note. The coders reached an intercoder reliability of a Krippendorff’s kappa of 0.89. The label 
of “junk news” is defined by fulfilling at least three of the five criteria. It refers to sources that 
deliberately publish misleading, deceptive, or incorrect information packaged as real news.
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Table 3. Identified types of IRA-associated Twitter accounts by Linvill and Warren (2020).
Category Specification
Right troll “Twitter-handles broadcast nativist and right-leaning populist messages. 
These handles’ themes were distinct from mainstream Republicanism. (…) 
They rarely broadcast traditionally important Republican themes, such 
as taxes, abortion, and regulation, but often sent divisive messages about 
mainstream and moderate Republicans. (…) The overwhelming majority of 
handles, however, had limited identifying information, with profile pictures 
typically of attractive, young women” (p. 5).
Hashtags frequently used by these accounts: #MAGA (i.e., “Make America 
Great Again,”), #tcot (i.e. “Top Conservative on Twitter), #AmericaFirst, and 
#IslamKills 
Left troll “These handles sent socially liberal messages, with an overwhelming focus 
on cultural identity. (…) They discussed gender and sexual identity (e.g., 
#LGBTQ) and religious identity (e.g., #MuslimBan), but primarily focused on 
racial identity. Just as the Right Troll handles attacked mainstream Republi-
can politicians, Left Troll handles attacked mainstream Democratic politici-
ans, particularly Hillary Clinton. (…) It is worth noting that this account type 
also included a substantial portion of messages which had no clear political 
motivation” (p. 6). 
Hashtags frequently used by these accounts: #BlackLivesMatter, #PoliceBru-
tality, and #BlackSkinIsNotACrime
Newsfeed “These handles overwhelmingly presented themselves as U.S. local news 
aggregators and had descriptive names (…). These accounts linked to legiti-
mate regional news sources and tweeted about issues of local interest (…). A 
small number of these handles, (…) tweeted about global issues, often with a 
pro-Russia perspective” (p. 6). 
Hashtags frequently used by these accounts: #news, #sports, and #local
Hashtag gamer “These handles are dedicated almost entirely to playing hashtag games, a 
popular word game played on Twitter. Users add a hashtag to a tweet (e.g., 
#ThingsILearnedFromCartoons) and then answer the implied question. 
These handles also posted tweets that seemed organizational regarding 
these games (…). Like some tweets from Left Trolls, it is possible such tweets 
were employed as a form of camouflage, as a means of accruing followers, 
or both. Other tweets, however, often using the same hashtag as mundane 
tweets, were socially divisive (…)” (p. 7).
Hashtags frequently used by these accounts: #ToDoListBeforeChristmas, 




Fearmonger “These accounts spread disinformation regarding fabricated crisis events, 
both in the U.S. and abroad. Such events included non-existent outbreaks of 
Ebola in Atlanta and Salmonella in New York, an explosion at the Columbian 
Chemicals plan in Louisiana, a phosphorus leak in Idaho, as well as nuclear 
plant accidents and war crimes perpetrated in Ukraine. (…) These accounts 
typically tweeted a great deal of innocent, often frivolous content (i.e. song 
lyrics or lines of poetry) which were potentially automated. With this con-
tent these accounts often added popular hashtags such as #love (…) and #rap 
(…). These accounts changed behavior sporadically to tweet disinformation, 
and that output was produced using a different Twitter client than the one 
used to produce the frivolous content. (…) The Fearmonger category was the 
only category where we observed some inconsistency in account activity. 
A small number of handles tweeted briefly in a manner consistent with the 
Right Troll category but switched to tweeting as a Fearmonger or vice-versa” 
(p. 7).
Hashtags frequently used by these accounts: #Fukushima2015 and #Colum-
bianChemicals 
Note. The categories were identified qualitatively analyzing the content produced and were 
then refined and explored more detailed via a quantitative analysis. The coders reached a 
Krippendorff’s alpha intercoder-reliability of 0.92.
